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Evaluating the faulty behavior of low-cost embedded microprocessor-based boards 
is an increasingly important issue, due to their adoption in many safety critical 
systems. The architecture of a complete Fault Injection environment is proposed, 
integrating a module for generating a collapsed list of faults, and another for 
performing their injection and gathering the results. To address this issue, the paper 
describes a software-implemented Fault Injection approach based on the Trace 
Exception Mode available in most microprocessors. The authors describe EXFI, a 
prototypical system implementing the approach, and provide data about some sample 
benchmark applications. The main advantages of EXFI are the low cost, the good 
portability, and the high efficiency. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Our society is facing with an increasing dependence on computing systems, even in 
areas (e.g., air and railway traffic control, nuclear plant control, aircraft and car 
control) where a failure can be critical for the safety of human beings. As a 
consequence, the past years have seen a growing interest in methods for studying the 
behavior of computer-based systems when faults occur, and several approaches have 
been proposed to evaluate the dependability properties of a computer-based system. 
 
In many cases, Fault Injection  [1] emerged as a viable solution, and has been deeply 
investigated by both academia and industry. Different techniques have been proposed 
and some of them practically experimented. One of the current challenges in the area 
is how to adapt these techniques to assess the hardware and software fault detection 
capabilities of high-volume, low-price microprocessor- (and microcontroller-) based 
safety critical products (e.g., those used in the automotive sector). 
 
 
The goal of this paper is to present a software-implemented Fault Injection system, 
named EXFI (Exception-based Fault Injector), suited to be used in embedded 
microprocessor-based boards. 
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The kernel of the EXFI system is based on the Trace Exception Mode available in 
most microprocessors. During the Fault Injection experiment, the trace exception 
handler routine is in charge of computing the Fault Injection time, executing the 
injection of the fault, and triggering a possible time-out condition. The tool is able to 
inject single bit-flip transient faults both in the memory image of the process (data and 
code) and in the user registers of the processor. The approach can be easily extended 
to support different fault models, such as permanent stuck-at, coupling, temporal and 
spatial multiple bit-flip, etc. 
 
 
A Fault List Manager is also included in the system to generate a collapsed list of 
faults to be injected. This module exploit the collapsing rules defined in [2], 
practically demonstrating how they can be implemented and how effective they really 
are. 
 
 
A case study is presented in which a Motorola M68KIDP board  [3] based on a 
M68040 microprocessor is considered; a prototypical version of EXFI has been 
implemented, and some sample application programs are considered. 
 
 
The main characteristics of EXFI are the low cost (it does not require any hardware 
device), the high speed (which allows a higher number of faults to be considered), the 
low requirements in terms of features provided by the Operating System, the 
flexibility (it supports different fault types), and the high portability (it can be easily 
migrated to address different target systems). 
 
 
The paper is organized as follows: after discussing some related research in Section 2, 
Section 3 states the adopted assumptions. Section 4 describes the Fault Injection 
environment, and Section 5 reports some experimental results. Some conclusions are 
eventually drawn in Section 6. 
 
2 RELATED RESEARCH 
 
 
The many different approaches proposed to implement Fault Injection (a detailed 
discussion can be found in [1]) can be categorized in three main groups: 
• Hardware-implemented Fault Injection: errors are emulated by changing the state 
of the system, either forcing faulty values on the pins of the chips [4], or injecting 
faults inside the chips through heavy-ion radiation [5]. These techniques require 
special and often expensive hardware, and do not allow injecting faults in every 
possible location.    
• Software-implemented Fault Injection: faults are injected under software control. 
The main advantages of software approach are the low complexity, the high speed 
of the experiment, and the higher flexibility in the set of injectable faults. The 
main disadvantage is the high degree of intrusiveness in the target system. 
• Simulation-based Fault Injection: faults are injected into a model of the system 
and its behavior is analyzed through simulation [6], [7]. This approach allows the 
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maximum flexibility in the type of faults that can be injected. Unfortunately, it 
usually involves a high effort for developing the system descriptions, and the 
experiments are mostly very time consuming. 
 
To have a fast and low cost solution to dependability evaluation problems, the 
software-implemented approach can be the most effective one. In fact, when simple 
boards have to be analyzed, hardware fault injectors are too cumbersome and too 
expensive. On the other hand, simulation-based fault injectors require the 
development of highly complex descriptions and are too time consuming and 
ineffective. 
 
Several different solutions for software-implemented Fault Injection have been 
proposed: 
• FERRARI  [8] uses software traps and trap handling routines to inject faults in 
CPU, memory and bus. Experiments are conducted on a Sun SparcStation, and the 
target system adopts Operating system calls, such as the UNIX ptrace, to corrupt 
the process memory image. 
• Xception  [9] uses a processor’s built-in hardware exception mechanism to trigger 
Fault Injection. Faults are triggered based on access to specific addresses. 
Xception has been implemented on a system based on a PowerPC 601 processor. 
 
By exploiting the microprocessor trace mode, EXFI does not require any change in 
the source code of the target software: with respect to FERRARI, our approach is 
oriented to simple embedded microprocessor systems, rather than to complex 
workstation-based ones. As a consequence, EXFI exploits the basic target 
microprocessor facilities, and the system is not supposed to provide any Operating 
system calls, such as the ones used in FERRARI. Moreover, EXFI does not insert 
software traps or Fault Injection routines in the target software, thus greatly limiting 
its intrusiveness. When compared with Xception, EXFI does not need any specific 
debugging features, as the ones exploited by the Xception tool for the PowerPC 
processor. 
 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the paper describes a Fault Injection environment, 
providing the user with a full range of well-integrated features, ranging from Fault 
List Generation and Collapsing, to an effective Fault Injection technique, and to a 
simple way for analyzing the faulty system behavior. The reported experience on 
some sample benchmark applications provides information about the usability of the 
environment. 
 
 
As a result, the EXFI approach is well suited for simple and low-cost systems, where 
the operating system support is not available, and the effort for setting up the Fault 
Injection experiments has to be very small. 
3 ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The adopted fault model is the transient fault. This model is frequently used in Fault 
Injection tools  [8]  [7] since it is very similar to the faults occurring in real systems 
[10]. The fault type adopted in the preliminary version of the tool is the single bit-flip, 
also known as Single Upset Event (SEU), but the approach can be extended to other 
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kinds of fault models. The Fault Injection time is expressed in terms of number of 
instructions executed since the beginning of the application execution. Faults can be 
injected in any memory location or register accessible through an Assembly 
instruction. 
 
 
Our technique is ideally suited to systems whose behavior, when a sequence of input 
stimuli is applied, can be deterministically computed and easily reproduced. To detect 
a target system faulty behavior we rely on the built-in Error Detection Mechanisms 
(EDMs), as system exceptions or software checks. 
 
 
In the present version we do not address the issue of checking the system behavior 
from the time point of view: the extension to real-time systems composed of several 
interacting modules is currently under study. 
 
4 FAULT INJECTION SYSTEM 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the EXFI Fault Injection system can be divided in three 
modules. The Fault List Manager (FLM) generates the fault list to be injected into the 
system, the Fault Injection Manager (FIM) injects the faults into the system, and the 
Result Analyzer collects the results and produces a report concerning the whole Fault 
Injection experiment. 
 
Fault List
Manager
Result
Analyzer
Fault Injection
ManagerFault List
Target
Program
Fault-free
system
behavior
Fault Injection
Report
Target system
 
 
Figure 1: The EXFI Fault Injection System. 
 
 
4.1 FAULT LIST MANAGER 
 
 
The Fault List Manager (FLM) generates the list of faults which are then injected in 
the target system by the Fault Injection Manager. Since the fault list size is a crucial 
parameter that directly affects the time required to perform the Fault Injection 
experiment, special care has been devoted to devise techniques, able to reduce the size 
of the Fault List, without reducing the meaningfulness of the Fault Injection results. 
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The architecture of the EXFI FLM is based on two modules: the Fault List Generator 
and the Fault List Collapser. 
 
 
The Fault List Generator generates a Fault List according to some input constraints 
(e.g., number of faults, boundaries of the used memory area, statistical distribution of 
faults, etc.). The Fault List Collapser implements the rules introduced in  [2] to 
process and possibly collapse the Fault List generated by the previous module. These 
rules aim at avoiding the injection of those faults whose behavior can be foreseen a 
priori, without affecting the accuracy of the results gathered through the Fault 
Injection experiments. The validity of the collapsing rules is bounded to the 
considered Fault Injection environment, and to the set of input data stimuli the target 
system is going to receive. 
A fault can be removed from the fault list when it fits in one of the following classes: 
• the fault is guaranteed to trigger an Error Detection Mechanism, e.g., because it 
affects the operative code of an instruction and changes it into an illegal operative 
code;  
• it is guaranteed not to have any effect, e.g., because it affects the code of an 
instruction after the very last time the instruction is executed; 
• it is equivalent to another fault already existing in the fault list, e.g., the two faults 
flip the same bit in the code of the same instruction during the period between two 
subsequent executions of the same instruction; the two faults are equivalent since 
they behave in the same way, and can thus be collapsed to a single fault. 
 
To collapse the fault list, the Fault List Collapser exploits the information collected 
during a preliminary golden-run experiment, in which the behavior of the Fault-Free 
System is observed and recorded. During this experiment, a modified trace procedure 
is used to record the sequence of executed instructions, and a post-processing phase 
elaborates the recorded information to assess the sequence of accesses performed to 
registers and memory variables. 
 
 
The Fault List Collapser also generates a report containing the information about the 
collapsed faults. This report is then used by the Result Analyzer to provide statistical 
results concerning the original Fault List. 
 
 
4.2 FAULT INJECTION MANAGER 
 
 
The Fault Injection Manager (FIM) is the most crucial part in the whole Fault 
Injection System. It is up to the FIM to activate the execution of the target application 
once for each fault in the list generated by the Fault List Manager, to inject the fault at 
the required time and location, and to observe the system behavior after the Fault 
Injection. The sequence of operations executed by the Fault Injection Manager is 
outlined in Figure 2 and explained in the following section. 
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Figure 2: Fault Injection Manager operation flow. 
 
The main issues to be faced when devising and implementing an effective Fault 
Injection Manager are: 
• Identification of the fault injection time and Fault Injection; the target application 
execution must be continuously monitored and, when the fault injection time is 
reached, the fault injection according to the fault type (e.g., single bit-flip) and 
location specified in the Fault List must be performed. 
• Fault Effects Observation: the system behavior after fault injection must be 
observed, and differences with respect to the fault-free system behavior identified. 
This requires the implementation of some time-out mechanism for the 
identification of faults forcing the system in endless loops. 
• Recovery from fault effects: the FIM should be able to recover from the effects 
generated by the injection of any fault; this requires that the FIM maintains the 
system control even in the likely event of a hardware exception being triggered. 
Moreover, the FIM should ensure that, for all the faults, the target application be 
run in the same fault-free initial environment, therefore avoiding that the effects of 
any fault (e.g., corrupted bit in data and code memory sections) be still present in 
the environment where the following experiment is run. 
 
The above tasks have to be accomplished while the target application is running and 
with a minimum intrusiveness with respect to its behavior. 
 
4.2.1 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
 
The following paragraphs describe the different modules that compose the overall 
FIM module. 
 
 
Experiment Initialization 
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This module initializes the system and prepares the environment for the Fault 
Injection into the target application program. 
 
 
It first makes a golden copy of the target and FIM program code and input data into a 
safe part of the system memory (i.e., one that can not be modified by fault effects). 
This can often be obtained by exploiting the memory protection mechanism provided 
by the Memory Management Unit integrated in most microprocessors. In this way, the 
FIM can start each new Fault Injection experiment using a known fault-free copy of 
data and code. 
 
 
The second task of this module is to create a new Exception Vector Table in order to 
replace the original exception processing routines with the new ones, which provide 
the Fault Injection and system monitoring capabilities, as described in the following. 
 
 
 
Initialization of the environment for the injection of the single fault 
 
 
The first task of this module is to restore the golden copy of the target application 
program to the memory area, where the program is going to be executed during the 
experiment. This operation is necessary to start a new experiment with a fault-free 
version of the target code and data. 
 
 
The second task of this module is to initialize some variables (e.g., the ones storing 
the information about the fault to be injected). 
 
 
Finally, the module enables the code tracing and jump to the first instruction of the 
target application code. 
 
 
 
Trace Procedure 
 
The Trace Procedure performs two main tasks: 
• It injects a fault into the system: each time the procedure is executed, a variable 
that stores the number of executed instructions is incremented. As soon as this 
value matches the injection time of the fault that has to be injected, the procedure 
performs its injection. 
• It monitors the instruction counter; if its value exceeds a user-defined limit the 
experiment is terminated and the fault is classified among those producing a time-
out. 
 
 
Exception Routines 
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In most microprocessors, an exception (or internal interrupt) is activated when some 
incorrect operation is performed or simply attempted. In such a case, a procedure is 
automatically activated. This mechanism can be exploited to implement an Error 
Detection Mechanism able to detect all faults triggering an exception during the 
system activity. The exception routines is suitably modified and performs two tasks: 
• It updates the data structure containing the information about the faults behavior  
• It returns the program execution to the main FIM loop. To perform this task, the 
procedure modifies the return address stored in the stack so that the execution of 
the return assembly instruction returns the execution control to the Experiment 
Control Loop instead of to the instruction that triggered the exception. In this way, 
no matter the type of exception triggered by the fault, it is possible to ‘recover’ the 
error and start the injection of a new fault. 
 
 
Target Application Result Check Routine 
 
A computer-based system is said to be Fail-Silent if it outputs only correct results, 
i.e., if the system does not output incorrect results even if they are possibly generated 
internally as a consequence of a fault [11]. Many researchers  [12] have shown that, in 
computer-based systems, a high percentage of faults cause a Fail-Silent Violation 
behavior, e.g., the system produces incorrect results while neither the EDMs nor the 
time-out checks are activated. Therefore, it is necessary that the application 
programmer provides a procedure (in Figure 2 called Observe_Fault_Behavior) able 
to verify the correctness of the results produced by the target application execution 
when it terminates without triggering any exception or time-out condition. 
Faults are classified according to four main categories: 
• Fail-Silent: the fault has no effect on the system behavior. 
• Detected by an EDM: the faulty system behavior triggers the activation of either a 
software or hardware EDM.  
• Fail-Silent Violation: the faulty system behavior does not trigger any EDM, and 
the output results are different from the fault-free ones. 
• Time-out: this category includes faults triggering the time-out condition. These 
faults alter the system behavior from a temporal point of view without triggering 
any EDM. 
 
4.3 RESULT ANALYZER 
 
 
The Result Analyzer processes the system output behavior obtained through Fault 
Injection experiments and the report on collapsed faults generated by the Fault List 
Manager. The Result Analyzer produces a report concerning fault coverage 
information referred to the whole Fault List. 
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our Fault Injection approach, a case study is 
described below. 
The EXFI environment has been implemented on a commercial M68KIDP Motorola 
board [3]. This board hosts a M68040 microprocessor with a 25Mhz frequency clock, 
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2 Mbytes of RAM memory, 2 RS-232 Serial I/O Channels, a Parallel Printer Port, and 
a bus-compatible Ethernet card. 
  
Some simple programs have been adopted as benchmark target applications: 
• Bubble Sort: an implementation of the bubble sort algorithm, run on a vector of 10 
integer elements; 
• Parser: a syntactical analyzer for arithmetic expressions written in ASCII format. 
The program also implements a simple software Error Detection Mechanism, 
which consists in verifying the correctness of each part of the expression; 
• Matrix: multiplication of two matrices composed of 10x10 integer values. 
For each target program, the original Fault List is composed of 30,000 randomly 
selected faults located in the code (10,000 faults) and data (10,000 faults) memory 
area, as well as in the microprocessor registers (10,000 faults). The original Lists of 
faults located in the code area and in the registers are then collapsed with respect to 
the given sequence of Input Stimuli. Due to the complexity of the post-processing 
phase, collapsing of faults in the data memory area is not implemented in the current 
version of EXFI. 
  
 
The results of the collapsing phase are reported in Table 1. They show very different 
collapsing figures depending on the benchmark program and fault location. 
 
 
In general, the percentage of collapsed faults among those to be injected in the code is 
quite stable. The amounts of faults activating an EDM mainly depends on the ratio 
between legal and illegal codes resulting from the microprocessor instruction set 
definition. On the other side, the collapsing figures for faults in data and registers 
mainly depend on the kind of application we are considering: in particular, one crucial 
parameter is the size of the data structures. This parameter strongly affects the 
percentage of no-effect faults, since larger data structures often imply a higher number 
of faults injected in a variable or register outside the period in which it is used. This is 
demonstrated by the high percent of faults removed by the Fault Collapser because 
they do not produce any effect in the Matrix benchmark, which has the largest data 
structures among the three considered programs. Moreover, the percentage of 
collapsed faults among those to be injected in the registers also depends on the 
complexity of the considered application and in the compiler capabilities in exploiting 
the available registers: in general, an intensive register usage reduces the effectiveness 
of the fault collapsing rules identifying equivalent and no-effect faults. 
 
 Bubble Sort Parser Matrix 
Location Code Reg. Code Reg. Code Reg. 
initial fault list size 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Total removed 
faults 
1,575 5,361 1,488 6,386 1,323 7,487 
 Detected by an 
EDM 
792 127 671 154 788 139 
 No effect 510 4,595 525 4,125 323 6,317 
 Fault Equivalence 273 639 292 2,107 212 1,031 
Table 1: Fault collapsing figures for faults injected in the code and in the registers. 
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Based on the Fault Lists generated by the Fault List Manager, the Fault Injection 
Manager performed the Fault Injection experiments, whose results are reported in 
Tables 2, and 3. 
 Bubble Sort Parser Matrix 
 Code Data Code Data Code Data 
Fault Category % % % % % % 
Fail-Silent 58.10 66.11 63.96 64.34 50.25 16.35 
Fail-Silent Violation 24.18 31.20 13.42 10.34 25.15 81.55 
Detected by an EDM 15.75 2.20 20.24 24.30 22.62 1.50 
Time-out 1.97 0.49 2.38 1.02 1.98 0.60 
Table 2: Faults injection report for the faults injected in the code and data area. 
 
 Bubble Sort Parser Matrix 
Fault Category % % % 
Fail-Silent 70.81 82.73 71.23 
Fail-Silent 
Violation 
2.97 2.99 3.18 
Detected by an 
EDM 
17.09 13.48 15.24 
Time-out 9.12 0.80 10.35 
 
Table 3: Faults injection report for the faults injected in the registers. 
 
The results of Tables 2 to 3 confirm that the behavior of faults injected in the code 
area is more regular than that of the faults injected in the data area, which highly 
depends on the characteristics of the considered application. As a further example, the 
reader should observe the very different percentages of Fail-Silent and Fail-Silent 
Violation Faults reported for the three benchmarks among those injected in the data 
area. Bubble and Parser are control-dominated programs: many variables (e.g., those 
associated with flags and loop indexes) are used for the execution flow control, and 
faults injected in them are likely to either trigger an EDM, or be fail-silent. On the 
other side, Matrix is data-dominated, and most variables contain data rather than 
control information. Faults injected in them are therefore more likely to generate Fail-
Silent Violations. 
 
 
The Result Analyzer collects the results produced by the Fault Injection Manager and 
takes into account the collapsing information provided by the Fault List Manager. The 
complete Fault Coverage figures with respect to the initial Fault Lists are reported in 
Table 4. 
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 Bubble Sort Parser Matrix 
 % % % 
Fail-Silent 60.62 62.86 32.09 
Fail-Silent 
Violation 
26.35 11.18 52.19 
Detected by an 
EDM 
11.98 24.40 14.54 
Time-out 1.06 1.56 1.19 
 
Table 4: Summary of Faults injection results. 
 
To quantitatively evaluate the time required to perform a Fault Injection experiment, 
we compared the total time required to perform the Fault Injection of 30,000 faults 
with the one required to execute 30,000 time the same program with the same input 
data in normal mode and without injecting any fault. The resulting ratio ranges 
between 20 and 22 for the considered benchmarks; the differences are mainly due to 
the different collapsing ratios obtained through the FLM. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we presented a Software-based Fault Injection environment suitable to 
be used for fault coverage evaluation on embedded microprocessor-based boards. 
 
 
Our environment is composed of three main parts: the Fault List Manager to generate 
and collapse the Fault List, the Fault Injection Manager to perform Fault Injection, 
and the Result Analyzer to produce output reports. 
 
During the Fault Injection experiments, the target application program is executed in 
trace mode and faults are injected by a suitably modified exception handler routine. In 
this way, faults can be injected into any location accessible through an Assembly 
instruction. Faults are injected without any change in the target application code and 
with very limited intrusiveness in the system behavior, the only overhead being in 
terms of an increase in the execution time with respect to a fault-free system. 
 
The approach is quite general and flexible, as it is based on common features 
supported by most microprocessors. Moreover, it does require neither dedicated 
hardware, nor any Operating system being present on the board, thus matching well 
the constraints of many low-cost embedded microprocessor-based systems. 
 
To practically evaluate the feasibility of the approach, a software Fault Injection 
environment has been set up for a Motorola M68KIDP board. The preliminary results 
gathered on some simple benchmark programs have been reported to demonstrate the 
advantages of the approach. 
 
Work is currently done to overcome the current limitations of the approach. In 
particular, we are working towards making it more efficient, by reducing the average 
time required to perform the analysis of each fault, and we are extending the described 
approach to a wider range of systems, e.g., those with real-time requirements, which 
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can not be dealt with by the current version of the environment. The goal is to provide 
the user with a flexible environment, allowing him to select the most suitable Fault 
Injection technique, depending on the characteristics of the system and on the design 
requirements. 
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